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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the twenty-first century enters its second decade, India’s population 
growth stands to place it as the world’s most populous nation by 2030.1  
Most of India’s population lives in rural villages,2 in close proximity to the 
nation’s forests rather than major metropolitan centers, like Delhi.  With a 
land area about one-third the size of the United States3 and a population 
almost four times as large,4 Indian forests are under increasing pressure from 
population growth as well as economic modernization.5  The forests are 
home to some of the world’s signature fauna, including the Bengal tiger and 
Asian elephant, as well as a diverse tropical flora unique to the 
subcontinent.6  The forests also contain vast reserves of natural resources, 
like timber products and minerals.7  With its population growing, demanding 
more resources, and consuming more, Indian forests face possible 
degradation.8  Any significant degradation would bring greater resource 
scarcity that would increase pressure on the government to provide those 
resources.  Difficulty by the government in provisioning the population 
would bring economic and political turmoil within India.  Given the 
country’s prominence in the world economy and the effect its instability 
could cause in world markets, and given the population pressures it faces, the 
importance of maintaining forest cover and the attendant resource 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., Population Challenges and Development 
Goals, at 5, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/248 (2005). 
 2 Rural-Urban Distribution, CENSUS OF INDIA, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Dat 
a_2001/India_at_glance/rural.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
 3 The World Factbook, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/pu 
blications/the-world-factbook/ (select “India” from the drop down menu of countries and 
locations, and then expand the “Geography” tab) (last visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
 4 Id. (select “References,” then “Guide to Country Comparison”, and then “Population”).  
It is estimated that by July 2012, the population of India will be 1,205,073,612, while the U.S. 
population will be 313,847,465.  Id. 
 5 See Surya P. Sethi, Principal Adviser, Power & Energy, Gov’t of India, Dialogue on 
Cooperative Action, India Presentation to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change COP-12 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/dialogue/applica 
tion/vnd.ms-powerpoint/061115_cop12_dial_india.pps. 
 6 See generally Shalini Bhutani & Ashish Kothari, The Biodiversity Rights of Developing 
Nations: A Perspective from India, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2002) (discussing 
the megabiodiversity of India).   
 7 The World Factbook, supra note 3 (select “India” from the drop down menu of countries 
and locations, then expand the “Geography” tab, and then expand the “Natural Resources” 
tab) (last visited Mar. 31, 2012); National Forest Policy, 1998, pmbl., No. 3-1/86-FP (India), 
available at http://moef.nic.in/divisions/fp/nfp.htm. 
 8 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, From a Fractured Compromise to a Democratic Consensus:  
Planning and Political Economy in Post-Colonial India, 26 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 611, 625 
(1991) (discussing how densely populated nations face special pressures in environmental 
planning).  
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availability is critical to ensure India’s economic and political stability.  The 
future of the forests and Indian stability depends on identifying ways the 
Indian government can effectuate maintenance of the nation’s forests.   
Unique among common law jurisdictions, India provides constitutional 
protections for the environment as well as a wide array of statutory schemes 
that address particular environmental concerns.9  Additionally, over the last 
thirty years, the Indian Supreme Court has adopted a more activist approach 
to its jurisprudence as it relates to social issues.10  The Court’s approach 
greatly expanded standing and induced much public interest litigation aimed 
at preventing environmental degradation, including deforestation.11  Given 
the potential ramifications of forest resource scarcity, it is necessary to 
examine the effectiveness of this judicial approach and enforcement of it 
through agency action.  This examination will aid in determining whether the 
current jurisprudence is effective or whether other legal solutions would 
provide greater protection to the forests.   
Part II of this Note provides a background on the three main Indian legal 
mechanisms for environmental protection: the common law, the Indian 
Constitution, and statutory schemes.  Part II also reviews the Court’s 
interpretations of both the Constitution and environmental statutes that 
facilitate its authoritative reach.12  In Part III, this Note surveys the 
development of the Indian Supreme Court’s activist jurisprudence, beginning 
with a discussion of the Court’s expansion of standing and public interest 
litigation, both of which not only enable a wider class of plaintiffs to bring 
suit to enforce constitutional rights and duties, but also provide a vehicle for 
remedying harms to the public interest.13  Part III also outlines how 
administrative agencies operate in India, focusing primarily on the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests.   
                                                                                                                   
 9 INDIA CONST. arts. 48A, 51A(g).  Article 48A directs the state to protect the environment 
and safeguard national forests.  Article 51A(g) mandates that Indian citizens protect and 
improve the environment, including forests.  See, e.g., The Forest (Conservation) Act, No. 69 
of 1980, INDIA CODE (1993) [hereinafter The Forest Act] (prohibiting state governments from 
using forests for non-forestry purposes without government approval); The Environment 
(Protection) Act, No. 29 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1993) (implementing environmental protection 
measures discussed at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972). 
 10 People’s Faith in Judiciary Led to Judicial Activism, Says Judge, TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 4, 
2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-11-04/Kanpur/30358832_1_judicial-acti 
vism-session-christ-church-college. 
 11 J. Mijin Cha, A Critical Examination of the Environmental Jurisprudence of the Courts 
of India, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 197, 199–204 (2005). 
 12 See Delhi Rd. Transp. Corp. v. DTC Mazdoor Cong., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 101, 193 (India) 
(“Public policy can be drawn from the Constitution.”). 
 13 Id. at 208–09 (discussing the liberalization of standing to increase court access for the 
poor and disadvantaged). 
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Part IV of this Note examines data on deforestation over the last twenty 
years in India and determines whether the rise of the Court’s activism 
contributed to increased protection for forests, or whether the Court took 
risks without resulting in corresponding benefits to the forests.  Finally, Part 
V outlines what the Court should do to minimize or reduce deforestation and 
also identifies how agencies can take steps toward full implementation of the 
protections the Court affords to better protect forests.   
II.  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
There are three basic legal mechanisms for protecting the environment in 
India: the Common Law, the Constitution, and more recently, environmental 
statutes, particularly the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980.  
A.  Indian Common Law 
Prior to 1970 and the beginnings of a statutory approach to environmental 
protection, Indian common law derived from the British legal system in 
place since the colonial era provided several avenues for protecting the 
environment.14  Similar to the British and American legal systems, Indian 
tort law recognizes nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability as the 
central causes of action available for protecting the environment.15  A brief 
description of each right of action is necessary to understand the overall 
framework of environmental protection in India. 
1.  Nuisance 
The Indian common law divides nuisance into public and private 
nuisance.16  The law defines public nuisance, which is both a tort and a 
crime, as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general 
public.”17  A member of the public, however, must show special damages in 
order to create a private right of action.18  As a result, environmental 
protection litigation based on a public nuisance cause of action rarely 
occurs.19 
                                                                                                                   
 14 KAILASH THAKUR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW AND POLICY IN INDIA 184 (1997) 
(discussing how Indian common law continues to provide these causes of action, with 
nuisance in particular remaining a popular choice for plaintiffs). 
 15 Id. at 185–93. 
 16 Id. at 185. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 186, 190.  
 19 See id. at 190 (noting that plaintiffs often cannot prove special damages). 
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Private nuisance is a tort defined as “the using or authorizing the use of 
one’s property or of anything done under one’s control, so as to injuriously 
affect an owner . . . of property by physically injuring his property or by 
interfering . . . with his health, comfort or convenience.”20  Most often, 
private nuisance claims arise as a result of continuing unreasonable use of 
land.21  Remedies for private nuisance include both damages and injunctions, 
depending on the factual circumstances.22 
The tort of nuisance has drawbacks in terms of environmental 
protection.23  A nuisance action generally requires the plaintiff to establish 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, something notoriously 
difficult to prove in Indian courts.24  Moreover, nuisance law application 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in India and therefore consistent 
results for plaintiffs are rare.25   
2.  Trespass 
Trespass is a less-used, but still viable, cause of action in Indian 
environmental cases.26  Trespass requires “an intentional invasion of the 
plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of property.”27  Trespass 
closely resembles private nuisance.28  It differs, however, with respect to the 
nature of the injury involved.29  With trespass the injury is direct, whereas 
with private nuisance it is consequential.30  Though courts readily give relief 
for trespass, even displaying an activist sentiment by bending the trespass 
definition to accommodate a wide range of pollution sources,31 invocation of 
this tort is rare.32   
                                                                                                                   
 20 Id. at 186. 
 21 Id.  
 22 J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal Seal, (1905) 9 C.W.N. 612 (India) (issuing an injunction 
preventing discharge of shellac refuse liquid into a municipal drain and awarding damages for 
harm to plaintiff’s health, comfort, and property value of garden).  
 23 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 189. 
 24 Id. (noting that this especially true in the case of large corporate defendants whose 
actions have high economic and social value). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 190. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.   
 29 Id. 
 30 Id.  An injury is direct if it results directly from the violation of a legal right.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th ed. 2004).  Consequential loss arises from the results of a direct 
injury, rather than from the injury itself.  Id. at 964. 
 31 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 190. 
 32 Id. 
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3.  Negligence 
The negligence cause of action in India is identical to that available in the 
United States.  Negligence requires (1) a legal duty of care; (2) a breach of 
that duty by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the breach and 
injury; and (4) the resulting injury.33  Negligence is used infrequently in 
environmental actions, often appearing only because of technical difficulties 
in nuisance actions.34  Additionally, negligence actions prove difficult in 
environmental contexts because of the need to establish a causal connection 
between the breach and injury given the inherent challenges in tracing the 
sources of pollutants.35 
4.  Strict Liability: The Rylands v. Fletcher Rule 
Though technically still good law, the strict liability rule derived from the 
English case Rylands v. Fletcher36 is infrequently applied in environmental 
protection actions in India.37  The rule states that “the person 
who . . . collects and keeps [on his land] anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its 
escape.”38  Because the liability is strict, defendants can raise few defenses.39 
The Indian Supreme Court, recognizing the difficulty in applying the 
Rylands rule, articulated a harsher strict liability rule in M.C. Mehta v. Union 
of India.40  There, the Court introduced an enterprise liability theory for 
businesses engaged in inherently dangerous activities.41  The theory creates 
absolute liability for any harm resulting from a hazardous activity engaged in 
by the enterprise.42  Despite this expansion of strict liability, however, the 
cause of action remains relatively unused.43  Unlike public interest litigation, 
                                                                                                                   
 33 Compare id. at 191, with 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2010).   
 34 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 192. 
 35 Id. at 193. 
 36 Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] UKHL 1, 3 (H.L.) 330. 
 37 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 193. 
 38 Rylands, 3 (H.L.) at 339–40. 
 39 Strict liability, unlike simple negligence, eliminates defenses based on causation (which 
also eliminates many defenses based on the duty element of negligence because of the close 
connection between the two), which are frequent grounds for defending against negligence 
claims.  Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common 
Law, Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (1988).  Certain defenses, 
such as denying possession of the thing “likely to do mischief,” and disputing the hazardous 
nature of the thing that causes injury, remain. 
 40 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819 (India).   
 41 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 195. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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which can enable relief applicable beyond the parties immediately before the 
court, strict liability typically produces limited relief focused only on the 
people or property directly injured by the presence of a mischievous or 
hazardous item. 
B.  The Indian Constitution 
This section discusses first the basic structure of the Indian Constitution; 
second, Article 21 of the Fundamental Rights, a common source of 
environmental protection; and third, how the intersection of the Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles are used by courts to enforce environmental 
protections.  
1.  Basic Structure 
Operating much like the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution 
contains the fundamental legal precepts of Indian society.44  The document is 
split into twenty-two parts.  The relevant sections for the purposes of this 
Note are Part III, Fundamental Rights; Part IV, Directive Principles of State 
Policy (Directive Principles); and Part IVA, Fundamental Duties.   
Part III, Fundamental Rights, is similar to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. 
Constitution, making inviolable by subsequent legislation basic protections 
such as freedom of speech, equal protection, and due process.45  Part IV, 
Directive Principles, does not have a ready analogue in American law.46  
This part of the Indian Constitution recognizes certain economic, social, and 
cultural rights retained by the Indian people.47  These rights, however, are 
nonjusticiable by virtue of Article 37 of the Constitution, which prevents 
judicial enforcement of the Directive Principles.48  It is the only section of 
                                                                                                                   
 44 INDIA CONST. preface (“Constitution is a living document, an instrument which makes the 
government system work.”).  Note also the organizational structure of the Constitution; rights 
and duties are labeled as “fundamental,” implying their centrality to Indian society and its 
legal system.  Id. pt. III. 
 45 See 1 A.S. CHAUDHRI, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS 168 (1958) (citing W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of 
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy . . . .”)).     
 46 The U.S. Constitution contains no article that sets forth foundational principles, not 
enforceable by judicial review, to guide Congress in its enactment of law.  Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution enumerates congressional powers but does not animate those powers with policy 
directives as the Directive Principles do for Indian constitutional provisions.  U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 47 INDIA CONST. arts. 41–43; see also Vrinda Narain, Water as a Fundamental Right: A 
Perspective from India, 34 VT. L. REV. 917, 920 (2010) (“[T]he Constitution recognizes 
economic, social, and cultural rights under the Directive Principles of State Policy.”). 
 48 INDIA CONST. art. 37 (“The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by 
any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance 
of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.”); 
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the Constitution “the violation of which by a law does not render [the law] 
pro tanto void.”49  Part IVA, Fundamental Duties, prescribes social 
behaviors incumbent on the Indian people to follow, in the interest of society 
as a whole.50  Of particular relevance, Article 51A(g) states that it is the duty 
of every Indian citizen “to protect and improve the natural environment 
including forests.”51  Like the Directive Principles, the Fundamental Duties 
are nonjusticiable, though they do guide the Supreme Court in determining 
governmental duties.52   
2.  Environmental Protection Based on Article 21 of the Fundamental 
Rights 
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution provides Indian citizens “[t]he right 
to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement 
[of fundamental rights].”53  The Court uses Article 21 (India’s version of the 
American Due Process Clause) to expand substantive rights available for 
enforcement through Article 32.54  By interpreting the right to life as it has, 
the Court created the market for public interest litigation—its preferred 
vehicle for enforcement of constitutional rights.55     
Through this broadening of the right to life, the Court articulated, among 
others, a right to education56 and an environmental right in the form of the 
enjoyment of a pollution-free environment.57  Public interest environmental 
litigation roared forward upon recognition of a right to environmental 
                                                                                                                   
Narain, supra note 47, at 920.   
 49 2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY 1923 (4th 
ed. 1993).   
 50 C.M. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE IN INDIA 14 (1999) (comparing the 
Fundamental Duties to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 51 INDIA CONST. art. 51A(g). 
 52 Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies 
from India, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 833, 851 n.95 (2008). 
 53 INDIA CONST. art 32. 
 54 Id. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.”); Narain, supra note 47, at 920.  It is interesting to note the 
Court’s utilization of the right to life, as opposed to Article 21’s liberty provision, in its 
expansion of protected rights.  Substantive due process in the American Supreme Court takes 
the opposite tack, protecting individual liberties through the liberty provision of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, 
MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 451 (2006). 
 55 Lavanya Rajamani, The Right to Environmental Protection in India: Many a Slip 
Between the Cup and the Lip?, 16 REV. EUROPEAN CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 274, 277 (2007). 
 56 Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658, para. 12 (India) (decided prior to 
the introduction of Article 21A in 2002 which guaranteed education for children ages six to 
fourteen).   
 57 Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420, para. 7 (India).   
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protection.58  The resulting cases produced a myriad of orders over the past 
thirty years, including the landmark decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of 
India, which required both central and state governments to establish mass 
education programs regarding the environment.59 
The Supreme Court frames the constitutional environmental right 
available in India as a negative right because Article 21 itself is framed as 
such.60  It is thus not a stand-alone right;61 rather, it is dependent on other 
rights for its enforcement.62  It is with this in mind that this Note turns to the 
interaction between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles in 
the context of the implied environmental right in Article 21.   
3.  Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles: Co-Application to Form 
an Enforceable Environmental Right 
In addition to the right of environmental protection that comes from the 
Court’s reading of Article 21, Article 48A, a Directive Principle, mandates that 
the “State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to 
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.”63  Reading the trio of 
Article 21, Article 48A, and the Preamble to the Indian Constitution together,64 
the Court has held that “[i]n deciding a case which may not be covered by 
authority[,] courts have before them . . . the trinity of the 
Constitution . . . . Lacking precedent, the court can always be guided by [its] 
light . . . . Public policy can be drawn from the Constitution.”65 
Although Article 37 limits direct enforcement of the Directive 
Principles,66 the Supreme Court treats the Fundamental Rights and the 
Directive Principles “like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than 
the other.”67  This, however, was not always the case.  Over the last three 
decades, the Court evolved its jurisprudence, going from a time where the 
Fundamental Rights always prevailed over the Directive Principles, to the 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275. 
 59 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 382 (India). 
 60 INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law.”); Rajamani, supra note 55, at 278 (defining a 
negative right as one that requires government inaction for effectuation, as opposed to a 
positive right, which requires action). 
 61 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 278. 
 62 Id. 
 63 INDIA CONST. art. 48A.   
 64 Id. pmbl. (calling for the Indian government to “secure to all its citizens,” justice, liberty, 
fraternity, and equality). 
 65 Delhi Rd. Transp. Corp. v. DTC Mazdoor Cong., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 101, 193 (India). 
 66 INDIA CONST. art. 37 (“The provisions contained in [these Directive Principles] shall not 
be enforceable by any court.”). 
 67 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, para. 61 (India). 
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last ten years, which have seen the Directive Principles shape activist 
interpretations of the Fundamental Rights.68 
Armed with Articles 21 and 48A and a “legal ideology . . . centered on 
public duty rather than on individual rights,”69 the Court has decided many 
cases in favor of greater environmental protection, including protection of 
forests.70  It appears that the Court fully intends to continue broadly 
interpreting the Constitution to afford greater judicial protection of the 
environment.  From a private property perspective, which would prefer 
private entities determine uses of land, this strategy may appear fraught with 
peril.71  Indian communitarian ideologies, however, see the Court’s 
jurisprudence as implementing unique Indian cultural ideals.72 
C.  Environmental Statutes  
1.  Early Statutes 
Local custom dictated use of forest resources in India prior to the British 
rule over India.73  The British subsequently regulated the forests as 
“resource[s] to be exploited.”74  Eventually the British adjusted their 
approach.75  The Indian Forest Act of 1927 (the 1927 Act) provided for the 
preservation of forests and set up a framework for forest management, 
including previously private forest lands.76  Within a few decades, however, 
it became apparent that the 1927 Act did not successfully protect the interests 
of forest inhabitants.77  Not only did the 1927 Act fail to protect the forest, 
                                                                                                                   
 68 ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 18; see also Minerva Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 
(holding two constitutional amendments passed by Parliament to be in violation of the basic 
structure of the Constitution, which structure is informed in part by the Directive Principles). 
 69 ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 18. 
 70 See, e.g., T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 4256 
(ordering the closure of saw mills within ten kilometers of protected forest). 
 71 Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions of Relativity, 
1992 BYU L. REV. 629, 631 (discussing the reactions of private land owners to environmental 
regulations affecting their future interest in their land). 
 72 ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 19. 
 73 S.S. Garbyal, Comments on Forest Legislation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT, FOREST 
& WILDLIFE PROTECTION LAWS IN INDIA 19 (1998); Timothy J. O’Neill, Through a Glass 
Darkly: Western Tort Law from a South and East Asian Perspective, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2009).  
 74 Garbyal, supra note 73, at 19. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.; The Indian Forest Act, No. 16 of 1927, INDIA CODE (1993), available at http://env 
for.nic.in/legis/forest/forest4.html. 
 77 Garbyal, supra note 73, at 19 (noting that the 1927 Act codified extraction of forest 
resources rather than addressing sustainability and local populations). 
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the 1952 National Forest Policy extended forests beyond their traditional 
area and gave impetus to forest farming and agricultural forestry.78 
In 1976, the national government, concerned with the rising rate of 
deforestation, enacted the forty-second amendment to the Indian 
Constitution, which transferred forests from state listing79 only, to concurrent 
listing with the government.80  Subsequently, the government formed the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) and established 
“administrative jurisdiction over national forest development.”81  MOEF and 
its role in forest protection are explored in greater depth in Part III below. 
2.  Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 
Four years after the forty-second amendment, the government enacted the 
Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 (the Forest Act).82  This legislation 
effectively prohibits state governments from “allowing the use of any forest 
lands for non-forestry purposes without the prior approval of the 
[government].”83  The Forest Act’s definition of non-forestry purpose 
includes “any purpose other than reafforestation; but does not include any 
work relating [to] . . . conservation, development and management of 
forests.”84   
The Forest Act also gives the government the power to create a 
committee to advise the government on grants of approval under Section 2 of 
the Forest Act, as well as on other matters relating to forest conservation the 
government sees fit to refer to the committee.85  Further, violations of the 
Forest Act carry criminal penalties, both for individuals who violate the Act 
and for negligent government officials.86   
In addition to creating an advisory committee, the Forest Act also 
empowers the government to promulgate rules for carrying out its 
provisions.87  In 1981, the government acted pursuant to Section 4(1) and 
                                                                                                                   
 78 National Forest Policy, 1952, No. 13-1/52-F (India), available at http://forest.ap.nic.in/fo 
rest%20policy-1952.htm. 
 79 India has a federal system of government, with states and a national government, much 
like the United States.  A simple read through of the Indian Constitution’s Table of Contents 
demonstrates the federal structure of India’s government.  INDIA CONST.   
 80 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277; The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, No. 
91 of 1976, INDIA CODE (1993). 
 81 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277 (noting that prior to the formation of MOEF there existed 
no agency for the administration of environmental policy). 
 82 Id.; The Forest Act, supra note 9.  
 83 Garbyal, supra note 73, at 20. 
 84 The Forest Act, supra note 9. 
 85 Id. § 3. 
 86 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277; The Forest Act, supra note 9. 
 87 The Forest Act, supra note 9, § 4. 
2012]         JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND DEFORESTATION IN INDIA  763 
 
created the Forest (Conservation) Rules (the Rules).88  The Rules define the 
composition and function of the advisory committee, as well as outline the 
considerations the committee must use in “tendering its advice.”89  The Rules 
also confirm that the advice of the committee is just that—advice.90  The 
government is in no way obligated to do anything more than consider the 
advice, having the power to “grant approval to [a] proposal with or without 
conditions or reject the same.”91   
Contemporary Indian legal scholars harshly criticize the Forest Act and 
associated rules.92  Many view the Forest Act as “merely centrali[zing] the 
power concerning forest land use,” without “[doing] much for the protection 
and conservation of forests.”93  Scholars also complain that though the Forest 
Act provides protection for property rights to forest land and products, it 
denies access to the forests by indigenous people who live in them.94 
In response to the Forest Act’s inability to either protect forests or carry 
out reforestation, the government resorted to administrative decrees to 
achieve those objectives.95  As well, the Indian Supreme Court effectively 
circumvented the Forest Act’s provision allowing application to the 
government for de-reservation96 of forests by determining that the word 
“forest” as used in the Forest Act encompassed and protected forests 
regardless of de-reservation or statutory recognition.97  The virtual 
abandonment of statutory procedures by the Court, as well as the 
government’s reticence to use the same, indicate that the Forest Act, while 
substantively inspirational to Supreme Court orders, is no longer 
procedurally central to Indian efforts at containing deforestation. 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, Forest (Conservation) Rules, 2003, Gazette 
of India (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://envfor.nic.in/legis/forest/gsr23(e).htm. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id.  
 92 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 278.  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Reservation is used to refer to the Forest Act’s prohibition on the use of forests, in effect 
reserving them, for anything other than forestry purposes. 
 97 See T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1228, 1230 
(India) (holding the provisions of the Forest Act “apply to all forests irrespective of the nature 
of ownership or classification thereof”). 
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III.  ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
A. Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court 
The Indian Constitution expressly provides for judicial review, unlike in 
the United States where the doctrine developed in the courts.98  The Indian 
Supreme Court, however, originally upheld executive and legislative actions, 
choosing to interpret the Constitution strictly, in keeping with the British 
positivist view of law.99  It was not until 1950, in A.K. Gopalan v. Madras,100 
that the Court first asserted its powers of judicial review.101   
Thereafter, the Court slowly grew into its role as a court of “good 
governance,” actively policing the actions of other branches.102  It was not 
until the post-emergency period103 “that the Court’s jurisprudence blossomed 
with doctrinal creativity as well as processual innovations.”104  
1.  Standing  
The major doctrinal innovation undertaken by the Court during this time 
was to expand standing requirements.105  The traditional approach to 
standing, in both American and Indian jurisprudence, has been that “only an 
aggrieved person that is [someone] who ha[s] suffered a specific legal injury 
[can] bring an action for judicial redress.”106  The Indian Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                   
 98 INDIA CONST. arts. 13 §§ 1–2, 32 § 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
(establishing the doctrine of judicial review in the United States); S.P. Sathe, Judicial 
Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29, 37–41 (2001). 
 99 S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 40–41 (2002). 
 100 A.K. Gopalan v. Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 (India).   
 101 SATHE, supra note 99, at 40.  In Gopalan, the Court upheld the government’s position, 
deciding not to exercise its power to void a legislative enactment.  Gopalan, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27. 
 102 SATHE, supra note 99, at 43 (using good governance in reference to the Court’s role as 
overseer of other governmental branches).  The Indian Supreme Court maintained a positivist 
approach to judicial review even after Gopalan.  Id.  For example, in 1975 the Court held by a 
4–1 vote that they were powerless to protect individuals from assertions of executive power, 
even if the assertion deprived the person of life and/or liberty.  A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant 
Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 (India).  Only in the arena of property rights did the Court 
attempt an activist approach, and even there they encountered stiff resistance from Parliament.  
SATHE, supra note 99, at 46. 
 103 The emergency period refers to two years of martial law declared by Indira Ghandi after 
the Allahabad State Court convicted her of election fraud.  Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due 
Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases, 
28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216, 243 (2010).  During this time the government restricted many 
civil liberties and fundamental rights.  Id. 
 104 SATHE, supra note 99, at 100 (stating that the post-emergency period is generally thought 
to run from 1977–1978). 
 105 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275. 
 106 Id. 
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rationalized the move away from this definition of standing as done “in the 
service of the poor, oppressed and voiceless.”107   
The Court’s first step in expanding standing was to recognize 
representative standing.108  In Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, the 
Court allowed the petitioner to move for redress of wrongs committed 
against those who could not approach the Court themselves, either because 
of social (caste) or economic disadvantage.109  In the same case, the Court 
also recognized epistolary jurisdiction, where letters to the Court are treated 
as writ petitions.110 
One year later, in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, the Court went even 
further, allowing members of the public to claim redress for public injuries 
arising out of a breach of public duty.111  The Court recognized the dangers 
inherent in opening its doors to what is often referred to as “citizen 
standing,”112 yet saw activism as “essential for participative public 
justice.”113   
2.  Public Interest Litigation 
This liberalization of standing requirements resulted in a new class of 
legal action: public interest litigation (PIL).114  PIL suits seek to redress 
wrongs to public interests, such as the right to a clean environment.115  PIL 
involves the Court in not only application of law to fact, but also fact-
finding, administrative agency monitoring, and policy determinations.116  
Under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court has far-reaching power to 
act in ways that would be unthinkable in an American court.117  The Court 
                                                                                                                   
 107 Id. 
 108 Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the 
Light of American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494, 499 (1987); SHYAM DIVAN & ARMIN 
ROSENCRANZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN INDIA: CASES, MATERIALS AND STATUTES 
135 (2d ed. 2002).  
 109 Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admin., (1980) 2 S.C.R. 557 (India). 
 110 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275. 
 111 Id.; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India). 
 112 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276 (“[I]f we keep the door wide open for any member of the 
public to enter the portals of the court to enforce public duty . . . the court will be flooded with 
litigation.”). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id.  Public Interest litigation can be pursued directly to the Supreme Court if the 
complaint, or citizen letter, alleges violation of a Fundamental Right.  Id. at n.30. 
 115 SATHE, supra note 99, at 211 (discussing Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of 
India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344 (India), a case where workers in a public sector company sued 
their employer to prevent losses to the public treasury). 
 116 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276. 
 117 INDIA CONST. art. 142 (empowering the Court to “make such order as is necessary for 
doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it”). 
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interprets this provision to encompass not only damages and injunctive relief, 
but also a wide range of administrative solutions, like continuing 
mandamus.118  This essentially allows the Court to monitor the executive and 
legislative branches.119  The Court also put in place bureaucratic committees 
to monitor the enforcement of final decrees, which are typically wide-
reaching.120 
However, the Court’s orders are enforceable only by the President, both 
at his discretion and in ways he finds appropriate, until such time as 
Parliament passes enforcement legislation.121  This apparent paradox in the 
form of a relatively toothless constitutional enforcement mechanism might 
be the root cause of much of the ineffectiveness in the Court’s orders.122   
After the Court recognized the right to a pollution-free environment in 
1991,123 it incorporated not only many established principles of international 
environmental law, but also some nascent ones into its environmental 
rulings.124  As international environmental law expert Lavanya Rajamani 
notes, “[t]hese [principles] include the polluter pays principle, the 
precautionary principle, the principle of inter-generational equity, the 
principle of sustainable development and the notion of the state as a trustee 
of all natural resources [including forests].”125  Combined with the advent of 
PIL, this wide-ranging environmental right led to the Court’s oversight of 
virtually every area of environmental governance.126   
For instance, in the Delhi Pollution Case,127 the Court on its own motion 
mandated that the administration of the state of Delhi use compressed natural 
                                                                                                                   
 118 According to Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules of India, the Court “may, if it thinks fit, 
grant such ad interim relief to the petitioner, as the justice of the case may require, upon such 
terms, if any as it may consider just and proper.”  The Supreme Court Rules, 1966, pt. IV, 
order xxxv, para. 9 (India). 
 119 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276.  Indian law professor Upendra Baxi referred to this as 
“creeping jurisdiction.”  Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in 
the Supreme Court of India, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER 289, 298–300 (R. Dhavan et 
al. eds., 1985).  
 120 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276. 
 121 INDIA CONST. art. 142 (“[A]ny . . . order so made shall be enforceable 
throughout . . . India in such manner as may be prescribed by . . . any law made by Parliament 
and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order 
prescribe.” (emphasis added)). 
 122 See generally SEERVAI, supra note 50; CHAUDHRI, supra note 46 (discussing the Indian 
constitution). 
 123 Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420 (India). 
 124 Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring Issues 
of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 293, 294 
(2007).  
 125 Id. at 294–95. 
 126 Id. 
 127 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086 (India).   
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gas in the city’s bus fleet in order to reduce air pollution.128  The Court 
essentially made a legislative policy choice that affected not only local 
governmental bodies, but also private citizens and companies.129  It is clear 
from the Court’s willingness to extend its authority over something as 
policy-specific as fuel choice for a city’s bus fleet that the lines between 
judicial and legislative purview blur when it comes to environmental 
concerns.130  This blurring continues today, with the Court issuing far-
reaching orders in PIL as recently as March, 2010.131 
B.  Indian Administrative Agencies 
As in many modern administrative states, agencies and local governments 
occupy key roles in the administration of environmental law in India.132  In 
India, the government established MOEF subsequent to the passage of the 
forty-second amendment.133  This ministry “is the nodal agency in the 
administrative structure of the [government] for the planning, promotion, co-
ordination and overseeing [of] the implementation of India’s environmental 
and forestry policies and programmes.”134   
MOEF is responsible for monitoring Indian forest cover and reporting its 
statistical data to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, in addition to other responsibilities.135  MOEF also coordinates and 
monitors the National Forest Commission, set up under Article 2 of the 
Forest Act.136  This commission advises MOEF as to whether applications to 
use forest land for non-forest uses should be approved.137  As noted above in 
                                                                                                                   
 128 Armin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case: The Supreme Court of 
India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 223, 233 (2003) (citing S.C. 
Writ Petition (Civil), M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1998) (No. 13029/1985), available at 
http://www.elaw.org/node/2783 (click the link below the word “Attachment”)). 
 129 Id. at 233–34. 
 130 SATHE, supra note 99, at 229–30 (discussing how the expanded meaning of justiciability 
in PIL creates a more positive role—in the sense of action as opposed to inaction—for the 
Court). 
 131 See Goan Real Estate & Constr. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 5 S.C.C. 388 (India) 
(holding construction completed within fifty meters of the coastline pre-1996 to be legal, 
despite public interest litigation setting aside the agreement which reduced the permitted 
construction zone to fifty meters).   
 132 1 M.P. JAIN & S.N. JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 663 (6th ed. 2007).   
 133 THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277. 
 134 About the Ministry, MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, http://moef.nic.in/ 
modules/about-the-ministry/introduction/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 135 Id.; see infra note 153. 
 136 Forest Policy Division, MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, http://envfor. 
nic.in/divisions/forpol.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 137 Id. (identifying that one of the functions of the commission is “mak[ing] 
recommendations indicating policy options for achieving sustainable forest and wildlife 
management and development, bio-diversity conservation and ecological security”). 
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the discussion of the Forest Act, however, both the application process and 
the commission have limited power, with the Court approving and denying 
applications.138  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is the only court to retain its jurisdiction 
over administrative tribunals set up by Parliament or state legislatures 
governing matters including environmental concerns.139  In S.P. Sampath 
Kumar v. U.O.I,140 the Court exercised this jurisdiction by defining the 
process for selection of tribunal members, going so far as to require legal or 
judicial experience for tribunal chairmen.141   
The Indian administrative system operates similarly to that of the United 
States and other common law countries in some respects, while differing in 
others.142  The fundamental difference between Indian and U.S.  
administrative law is the application of the separation of powers doctrine.143  
The U.S. constitutional framework provides for three mutually exclusive 
branches of government.144  Though the judicial branch is nominally 
separated from the legislative and executive branches in India,145 in reality 
the Supreme Court has gathered so much control that it is, in effect, a court 
of good governance over the other branches, not just a judicial organ.146 
The centralization of power in the Court is not without reason, 
however.147  Administrative agencies in India, including MOEF, often do not 
enforce their mandates.148  There is little accountability,149 and thus agencies 
have little incentive to respond to public grievances.150 
                                                                                                                   
 138 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1228 (India). 
 139 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 663 (noting that Article 323B of the Indian Constitution 
“empowers the appropriate legislature to provide . . . tribunals . . . with respect to the 
following matters: (i) taxation . . . [and] (v) land reforms,” which can exclude the jurisdiction 
of any court except the Supreme Court). 
 140 S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 435 (India). 
 141 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 664. 
 142 1 id. at 17–19 (noting that all common law systems are subject to the same rule of law 
principle, yet are driven by different constitutional law backgrounds).   
 143 1 id. at 17, 31. 
 144 See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (Article I provides for legislative authority to reside with 
Congress.  Article II consigns all executive authority to the president.  Article III establishes 
the federal judiciary and the scope of its jurisdiction); 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 32. 
 145 See INDIA CONST. pts. VI, IXA (laying out structure of the National Government’s 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as defining the role of municipalities in 
the Indian system). 
 146 SATHE, supra note 99, at 43 (noting that the Court was not a mere legal court and had a 
political role to play). 
 147 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 2296 (concluding that judicial activism has been helpful 
in the area of environmental protection because of the “apathy and inertia of the 
Administration to enforce anti-pollution laws”). 
 148 Id. at 2309 (discussing how “public interest litigation has grown in India because of 
bureaucratic unresponsiveness”). 
 149 India does not have an ombudsman system—where non-agency officials oversee 
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In addition to systemic inertia, agencies also face potential shortfalls in 
the resources needed to effectively monitor compliance, monitor 
afforestation, and seek redress for grievances against the public interest.151  
For instance, though spending levels on afforestation and reforestation are 
higher now than they were ten years ago, funding dropped in certain years, 
with a recent downward trend from the highs of 2007.152  Faced with such 
resource constraints and inertia issues, agencies cannot be relied on to deliver 
reliable environmental protection. 
IV.  ACTIVISM AND DEFORESTATION  
Before addressing the impact of activism on deforestation, it is important 
to have a sense of what India’s forests look like today as compared to years 
past.  Unlike many countries in southeast Asia, according to official reports 
India’s forests have not seen high rates of deforestation over the previous 
twenty years.153  In fact, according to the Indian government and United 
Nations (whose statistics derive from reports submitted by the Indian 
government), Indian forests today cover a slightly higher percentage of the 
land area than twenty years ago.154  These appraisals of forest cover, 
however, may not paint the most realistic portrait of Indian forests.155  
Evidence suggests that removing the growth in commercial exotic tree 
plantations from forest growth calculations would show actual deforestation 
of native Indian forests.156  Data indicates that, since the 1990s, these 
plantations grew at a rate of approximately 18,000 square kilometers per 
year.157  If in fact government statistics do not compensate for the growth in 
plantations, deforestation rates for native forests and the success of 
afforestation may need reexamination.   
                                                                                                                   
agencies’ adherence to their mandates—to ensure agency accountability.  Id. at 2269. 
 150 Id. at 2309. 
 151 See National Afforestation Program: Year-wise Summary, 2000-2010, NAT’L 
AFFORESTATION & ECO-DEV. BOARD, http://www.naeb.nic.in/statics.html (under Statistics at a 
Glance, and National Afforestation Programme (NAP), click “Funds Released”) (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2011) (stating that from 2000–2010 approximately $500 million went toward 
afforestation programs in all twenty-nine states).   
 152 Id. 
 153 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2010, at 230 
(2010), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1757e/i1757e.pdf (noting Indian forest 
cover was 63,939 hectares in 1990 and 67,709 hectares in 2004).  
 154 Id. 
 155 Jean-Philippe Puyravaud et al., Cryptic Loss of India’s Native Forests, 329 SCIENCE 32, 
32 (2010) (discussing how satellite imagery used to determine forest cover does not 
distinguish between commercial tree plantations and native forest cover). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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With that picture of the state of forests roughly outlined, it is now proper 
to overlay judicial activism and forestation rates to determine if the former 
has affected the latter.  As discussed above, the Indian Supreme Court’s 
environmental reach has expanded greatly since 1980.158  The Court oversees 
administrative tribunals and it allows anyone to write a letter and initiate 
public interest litigation.159  Access to the Court for judicial redress could not 
be broader in terms of standing.160  Court control over the other branches of 
government exceeds that of other constitutional common law courts in the 
world.161   
At the same time, as the Court opened its doors to all comers and 
exercised greater control over administrative actions, the forests of India 
remained vulnerable, even shrinking according to some statistics.162  On its 
face, data suggesting that forest cover shrank over the last twenty years 
partially contradict any assertion that the Court’s judicial activism played a 
successful role in providing adequate protection to forests.  If forest cover in 
fact shrank, the relaxation of standing requirements and the increase in 
public interest litigation correlate to a slight decrease in forest cover.  If 
government statistics represent reality, however, these doctrinal changes 
correlate to a slight increase in forest cover.163   
Such a comparison is incomplete, however.  A second question must be 
asked before the true effect of the Court’s activist approach on deforestation 
can be understood.  What would have happened had the Court not expanded 
standing and encouraged public interest litigation?  Although speculative in 
                                                                                                                   
 158 See, e.g., S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India) (expanding standing 
to include citizen standing in public interest litigation); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 
1992 S.C. 382 (India) (involving four hundred industries and one hundred municipalities in 
oversight by the Court). 
 159 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 663 (outlining the retained jurisdiction of the Court 
over administrative tribunals); see also Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275 (noting that the Court 
recognized epistolary jurisdiction in Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admin., (1980) 3 S.C.C. 488). 
 160 Allowing any person, injured or not, to initiate suit, whether they intended to or not, is at 
least close to the outer limit of standing.  Cf. Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (outlining the elements of standing in American courts).  The 
Indian Supreme Court requires that an injury to the public be present, but does not limit who 
can seek redress for it.  See S.P. Gupta, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. 
 161 The British Supreme Court does not have the power to invalidate laws of Parliament.  
Monica A. Fennell, Emergent Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
279, 295 (2008).  The American Supreme Court retains the power to invalidate laws of 
Congress; however, it also retains strict rules of standing requiring a “concrete and 
particularized injury” to sustain a cause of action.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 162 Puyravaud et al., supra note 155, at 32. 
 163 See supra note 153 (citing government statistics that show greater forest cover in 2004 
than 1990). 
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nature, this inquiry is necessary to understand the full effects of the Court’s 
approach.  
Precise forest cover levels, absent expanded standing, are impossible to 
discern.  The standing expansion is historical fact and cannot be erased from 
the record.  The effects of traditional standing on judicial enforcement of 
rights and the likelihood of Indian agency inaction absent judicial prodding, 
however, are known.  Agencies simply do not enforce statutes as vigorously 
without oversight, whereas when courts hold them accountable there is more 
incentive to take action.164  The Court’s expanded standing requirements, 
moreover, increase citizen enforcement actions and PIL in the environmental 
context and in doing so increase opportunities for oversight of agencies.165  
Together, these two known cause-and-effect relationships suggest that, at a 
minimum, governmental enforcement (judicial or administrative) of forest 
laws would wane absent the Court’s activist stance.      
If a lack of expanded standing and public interest litigation decreased 
enforcement as expected, it is also likely that forest cover would decline in 
tandem.  Without judicial oversight and agency enforcement, industries 
would not be as accountable for encroaching on indigenous lands in their 
search for minerals and forest products.  There would be few consequences 
to forest destruction other than higher profits, something private entities 
pursue with vigor.  
Unprotected, the commons (public utility lands for the common benefit of 
villagers)166 would face rapid extinction at the hands of those who would 
exploit public resources for private benefit.  Given the risks to the judicial 
system posed by liberal standing requirements and an activist approach to 
judicial decision making,167 however, it bears examining whether the Court’s 
activism benefits more than it burdens.  The fears of expanded standing 
include a multiplicity of frivolous lawsuits and the resulting judicial morass, 
as well as “the predilections of the judges [ruling] the day.”168  Despite these 
reasonable fears, the expansion of standing in India has not resulted in the 
Court hearing a plethora of nonjusticiable issues.169  This is at least in part 
                                                                                                                   
 164 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132. 
 165 SATHE, supra note 99, at 224–25 (discussing the wide range of circumstances in which 
the Court dealt with environmental protection in the face of government intransigence). 
 166 See Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 1132/2011 at SLP(c) No. 
3109/2011, para. 3 (India).   
 167 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276 (noting fear of litigation flood if standing were relaxed).  
 168 Id. at 285.  
 169 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 2314 (noting that to avoid ruling in favor of claims that 
under previous standing doctrine would have been nonjusticiable, the Court can (1) refuse to 
decide a case on the merits; (2) dismiss for failure to state a claim; or (3) reject the claim on 
the merits rather than deny relief because of a lack of standing).  
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because there is no recovery for the named plaintiff in PIL outside of the 
protection sought for the public interest in which the plaintiff shares.170   
Fears of a judge’s own views dictating outcomes are also often espoused 
in opposition to activist jurisprudential approaches.171  In the United States 
today, the phrase “judicial activism” is practically an epithet, for the very 
reason that it implies a judge making his own law instead of applying the law 
as found in precedent.172  There exists a notion that society is ill-served by an 
unelected body having the power to hand down law without going through a 
legislative process.173   
In India, however, judicial activism occurs in a different cultural milieu, 
surrounded by different governmental institutions and capabilities.  Indian 
society does not have the same emphasis on private property or 
individualism that is present in U.S. society.174  Communitarianism rather 
than individualism is the dominant ideology, and it has only grown in 
importance since the end of British rule.175  The Preamble to the Indian 
Constitution even states that the document forms a socialist government; a 
form more oriented toward community rights than the constitutional system 
of the United States.176   
Moreover, the Indian Government has a history of corruption in all areas 
of governance, not just environmental protection.177  From the time of Indian 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in 
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 159, 
165 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000) (“A PIL petitioner is provided by the Court as one who 
draws its attention to a grievance requiring remedial measures and having no personal stake in 
the matter.”). 
 171 Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929, 
939 (2007) (listing elements common to many understandings of judicial activism).   
 172 See, e.g., Alexander Mooney, Specter Issues Parting Blow to Roberts, Alito, CNN, http://p 
oliticalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/12/21/specter-issues-parting-blow-to-roberts-alito (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2012). 
 173 Dinh, supra note 171, at 940 (“An activist court ‘legislates from the bench,’ and thus, 
‘encroaches on the legislature’s constitutional turf.’ ”).   
 174 ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 83 (“[I]ndividualistic notions are made subservient to the 
needs of the system as a whole, in effect a situation where public interest overrides private 
interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 175 Sarah Joseph, Politics of Contemporary Indian Communitarianism, ECON. & POL. 
WKLY., Oct. 4, 1997, at 2517.   
 176 INDIA CONST. pmbl.; Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas K. Ruppert, Defending the 
Polygon: The Emerging Human Right to Communal Property, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 681, 694 
(2006) (noting that the protection of civil and political rights, rights at the center of the U.S. 
Constitution’s protections, came before socialism, which grew in response to the economic 
disparities present at the beginning of the twentieth century).  
 177 Ashish S. Prasad & Violeta I. Balan, Strategies for U.S. Companies to Mitigate Legal 
Risks from Doing Business in India, in DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA: CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES FOR 
U.S. COMPANIES 31 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 11926, 2007) 
(discussing the pervasiveness of bribery in both government and private sector engagements). 
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nobility pre-British rule, through 1948 when India regained its independence, 
to modern times with an elected executive, the persons and bodies in charge 
of the country have often exploited the commons to benefit a select few.178  
From maharaja, the Indian version of an English king, to the prime minister, 
executives in India are not known for judicious handling of the country’s 
resources. 
As a result of executive misfeasance and nonfeasance, the Indian 
Supreme Court began oversight of executives, both state and federal, in a 
multiplicity of circumstances, including over MOEF and environmental 
decisions (and non-decisions).179  Given the historical exploitation of the 
commons and the propensity for executive inaction, the Court’s oversight 
role appears more appropriate.  Although Americans may blanch at the idea 
of the judiciary essentially legislating from its unelected perch, Indian forests 
likely benefits from this approach.  The commons, including the forests, 
receive much greater protection and attention from the Court than they have 
under the oversight of any other body.180   
Because expanded standing has not resulted in a flood of frivolous 
lawsuits, and judicial oversight is likely an appropriate response to executive 
inability or unwillingness to protect the commons, judicial activism remains 
a viable component of protecting Indian forests.181  Though forest cover may 
be less than it was when the Court began its activist approach, there is no 
reason to suspect the Court’s jurisprudence had no positive effect on the 
deforestation rate.  To the contrary, it is far more likely that absent the 
Court’s direction, forests in India would cover even less of the nation than 
they currently do.  Therefore, absent clear negative impacts of its activist 
jurisprudence on governmental institutions or society, the Court should 
continue its activist approach as a court of good governance.   
                                                                                                                   
 178 See ANN GRODZINS GOLD & BHOJU RAM GUJAR, IN THE TIME OF TREES AND SORROWS 
126 (2002) (describing how the commons once were the private lands of the maharaja); 
Prasad & Balan, supra note 177, at 31 (citing a 2000 survey by India’s Central Vigilance 
Commission finding that “almost fifty percent of Indians [using] government services pay 
bribes”).  Modern exploitation often is less a matter of agencies actively working against 
communitarian interests and more a matter of agencies and the executive not acting, that is, 
failing to enforce their legislative mandates. 
 179 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276. 
 180 Id. at 278.  Though beyond the scope of this Note, one might validly ask whether that 
protection comes at a cost in terms of economic development.   
 181 If the Supreme Court ever allows its personal predilections to trump the public interest 
when it is deciding cases, its activist tendencies could be used to make policy choices 
damaging rather than reparative to the public interest.  As outlined above, however, this 
eventuality is unlikely to occur at an institutional level given Indian societal makeup.    
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V.  MOVING FORWARD 
This Part attempts to provide a blueprint for agency and Supreme Court 
action to ensure that the government protects India’s forest-based resources.  
First, this Part will outline the steps the Court should take to prevent 
deforestation.  Second, it will propose a plan of action for MOEF and other 
relevant agencies that will minimize agency inaction on forest matters and 
make better use of the limited resources agencies have at their disposal. 
A.  The Indian Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century 
As detailed in the previous Part, expansions in activist jurisprudence have 
for the most part been implemented.  For example, it would be very hard for 
the Court to liberalize standing further.182  Furthermore, the Court does not 
view its activist approach as particularly controversial, as the justices almost 
universally accept the role the Court has today.183  Thus, it is unlikely that 
any further acceptance of activism by the Court would increase the scope of 
its application. 
Given that its activist approach to environmental issues has seen some 
success in protecting forests,184 the Court should continue to invite PIL and 
maintain standing requirements as they currently exist.  To hold accountable 
those responsible for deforestation, the Court should continue to recognize 
epistolary jurisdiction as a way to increase and equalize access to the judicial 
system.  Moreover, the Court should continue to respond to such letters by 
initiating Court-monitored investigations and commissions.  Though outside 
the traditional ambit of a constitutional court, the need for this oversight 
persists because many Indian political and industrial interests continue to 
subvert the public interest in a protected environment.185   
Moreover, should the Court retract its standing expansion and embrace of 
PIL, citizens seeking to enforce forest policy and their fundamental rights 
under the Constitution would have a meager basket of remedies.  As shown 
above in the review of common law remedies, nuisance and its companions 
do not effectively address all the harms that occur to the environment and the 
public.  The injury requirement inherent in those actions precludes the vast 
majority of the populace from participating in litigation and thus requires that 
                                                                                                                   
 182 Rajamani, supra note 55, at 278. (noting the liberalization of standing in India and the 
fear of a flood of litigation if it is expanded further).  
 183 ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 35. 
 184 See e.g., T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. India, (1997) 2 S.C.C. 267 (India) (refusing 
to grant clearance to an aluminum mining project on forested land). 
 185 Ajit Menon, Situating Law: Adivasi Rights and the Political Economy of Environment 
and Development in India, in LAW, LAND USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AFRO-INDIAN 
DIALOGUES 363 (2007). 
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actions be brought by a narrow subset of the population.  Often those 
excluded because of the injury requirement are those in a position to bring 
suit, while those who sustain injury often are not.   
In addition to maintaining its current standing requirements, the Court 
should also continue with its promotion and treatment of PIL.  Through that 
vehicle, the Court manages to wield an immense amount of control over both 
executive and parliamentary action.  Though potentially harmful to notions 
of separation of powers and rule by democratically elected branches of 
government, the Court’s oversight is not currently tainted by judges’ 
individual motivations.  The Court’s idealism regarding the proper role of 
government and the enforcement of law guides its oversight and leads to a 
pursuit of justice.   
Moreover, the benefits of PIL, at least in the current state of governance 
in India, outweigh the detriments.  PIL allows redress of grievances that 
would otherwise go without remedy.  With agencies often unwilling or 
unable to enforce environmental law and policy, there must be some 
alternative that allows protection of public interests.  PIL fulfills this role, 
coupled with citizen standing, by allowing anyone to bring actions for 
redress of public harms.  Without PIL, deforestation in India would likely 
increase because there would be substantially less enforcement of the forest’s 
legal protections.   
The occasional nuisance claim by one injured party does not carry the 
severity or constancy required for nuisance to act as an adequate deterrent to 
deforestation.  Businesses would have fewer incentives not to exploit the 
forests if PIL standing did not exist.  The threat of judicial oversight and 
agency regulation of business projects provides greater incentive to abide by 
forest protection requirements than does a suit brought by one person with an 
individual injury.   
B.  Administrative Agencies Moving Forward 
Indian agencies often have idealistic mission statements and glass-half-
full views of their own accomplishments.186  They have a history of inaction 
in the face of citizen concerns and even in the face of legislative and judicial 
mandates to act.187  Agency inaction was compounded by the recent 
economic downturn, which impacted government revenues and caused 
                                                                                                                   
 186 See, e.g., About the Ministry, supra note 134. 
 187 See generally JOINT COMM. OF MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS & MINISTRY OF TRIBAL 
AFFAIRS, GOV’T OF INDIA, REPORT NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON FOREST RIGHTS ACT (2010), 
available at http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/FRA%20COMMITTEE%20RE 
PORT_FINAL%20Dec%202010.pdf.   
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expenditures on deforestation programs to decline.188  Any recommendations 
for future action must be made in light of agency inertia and inadequate 
enforcement resources. 
One possible approach moving forward is to reorganize the Indian 
environmental bureaucracy by placing MOEF under the direct supervision of 
the Supreme Court.  Arguably, placing the agency under closer supervision 
would incentivize it to act in the face of citizen petitions and blatant 
violations of law.  However, the Court already exercises oversight over 
virtually all administrative tribunals either directly, by establishing criteria 
for selecting tribunal members,189 or indirectly, by preventing tribunal-
created legislation from exempting tribunals from the Court’s jurisdiction.190   
A solution addressing fundamental questions about organization is 
necessary to change the deep-seated tendency not to act by MOEF and other 
agencies.  First, parliament should pass regulatory legislation that creates a 
system-wide sense of accountability for agency inaction.  Establishing an 
ombudsman to oversee administrative agencies would be a good first step.  
Considering the Court’s successful (as compared with the executive branch) 
oversight of MOEF and other agencies, the Court should be the venue for 
any ombudsman’s reports.  The Court has the power to act on such reports 
and, through its activist approach, has demonstrated its ability to hold 
agencies accountable.  As perhaps the only institution in India with a 
demonstrated history of prioritizing community values, the Court is uniquely 
positioned to resist the tug of corrupting influences.    
Those tribunals or agencies that fail to act in the face of evidence that 
environmental laws are being violated should face repercussions.  These 
repercussions, however, should not negatively impact efforts at afforestation 
and environmental protection.  Budgets should not be cut in response to 
agency inaction.  Rather, agencies should operate more like private 
enterprises, with pay and job security tied to performance.  Agency jobs 
should not be viewed as assignments with guaranteed pay and little work, but 
they must pay enough to discourage wage-related turnover.  These jobs 
should be structured to incentivize people to work hard.  Benefits and pay 
should flow to those who are not corrupt and who enforce the Court’s orders 
and statutory mandates.  Those who do not perform or are involved in any 
corruption should be terminated. 
The consequences of inaction should be certain, swift, and proportional 
for infractions by omission.  No sanction is worth enacting if it is not applied 
in every instance possible and with haste.  Deterrence will not flow if agency 
                                                                                                                   
 188 National Afforestation Program: Year-wise Summary, 2000-2010, supra note 151. 
 189 S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 124 (India). 
 190 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 663. 
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employees do not view possible consequences as a probable reality for 
inaction.  Moreover, consequences must be proportional to the offense.  In 
other words, if a consequence is not strict enough, there will be no incentive 
to discontinue the inaction, but if a consequence is too strict, the job will 
hold very little appeal and drive valuable people away from protecting the 
forests.   
There should also be accountability for those tasked with exercising 
agency authority.  That is, the individuals within agencies should face some 
measure of punishment for inaction in their sphere of responsibility.  One 
possible model of accountability for agency employees would be the 
command responsibility standard featured in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Article 28.191  Under this model, those in positions of 
authority would be held accountable for the inaction of their inferiors if they 
knew or should have known that improper inaction took place.   
This system of individual accountability at the agency level has the 
benefit of imposing sanctions on the parties most likely to benefit from 
inaction.  Authority figures, not low-level employees, control the agenda in 
any hierarchical organization and targeting them is more cost-effective and 
efficient at reducing infractions than attempting to punish all employees who, 
through inaction, act inappropriately.   
Second, environmental protection and MOEF must garner a larger portion 
of resources than they currently do.  At some level, an agency’s ability to 
take effective action is simply a matter of prioritizing national problems.  As 
long as the national government decides that forest protection should take a 
backseat to other issues, there will always be a disconnect between what the 
agencies can do and what the law and Court require of them.  That is not to 
say that more money is a panacea for deforestation.  What more resources 
will bring, however, is greater incentive for agency employees to act on an 
individual level.  If employees feel they have the resources to do their jobs 
effectively and if they receive competitive wages, they are that much more 
likely to act accordingly. 
Moreover, greater resources enable agencies to engage in more 
enforcement and remediation actions.  However, more ability does not 
necessarily translate into more action.  Therefore, careful monitoring of 
agencies and their resource expenditures would be necessary to ensure that 
any additional resources were fruitfully employed.   
                                                                                                                   
 191 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
India’s forests contain not only a vast array of species, but also a vast 
array of resources.  The forests contain minerals, timber, and perhaps most 
importantly, land.  As the population of India continues to grow, the 
pressures to extract those resources by removing the forests will increase 
correspondingly.  Without protection and sustainable management, the 
forests will fall victim to the rising tide of human demands on its contents.     
India possesses many legal mechanisms with which it can protect forests.  
Owing to its common law heritage, causes of action such as nuisance, 
trespass, and strict liability exist to protect primarily private interests in the 
environment.  India also has several environmental statutes that protect broad 
swaths of the environment.  The Indian Forest Act of 1927 and the Forest 
(Conservation) Act of 1980 work together to establish a framework for forest 
management.   
India’s most unique protection for the environment and forests is the 
Indian Constitution.  It contains environmental policy guidance for 
parliament,192 as well as a guarantee of life that the Indian Supreme Court 
interprets as providing a right to a protected environment.193  Unlike other 
common law jurisdictions, India’s most basic legal instrument is used to 
directly addresses the question of forest protection. 
The activist jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court overlays all three 
sources of forest protection.  Over the last several decades, the Court 
eliminated the vast majority of standing requirements, most of which 
demanded personal injury and formal pleading requirements.  Now people 
from any walk of life, with any amount of money, can petition the Court to 
remedy harm to the public interest, including the public’s interest in forests.  
The rise of PIL involves the Court in a much broader spectrum of cases and 
broader oversight of the national and local governments.   
Nevertheless, the positive effect judicial oversight has on the forests is 
insufficient in the face of the certainty of population growth.  Some data 
even suggests that Indian forest cover actually shrank over the last twenty 
years as the Court adopted a more activist approach.194  Since populations are 
guaranteed to rise and current protections may be inadequate at current 
population levels, a modified approach is necessary. 
The Supreme Court’s activism likely stemmed from a tide of 
deforestation caused by demands from the present population, but it has not 
achieved greater forest protection in the recent past.  However, the Court is 
                                                                                                                   
 192 INDIA CONST. art. 48A (“The State shall endeavour to protect . . . the forests . . . of the 
country.”). 
 193 Id. art. 21. 
 194  Puyravaud et al., supra note 155. 
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not omnipotent and relies on the executive agencies, like MOEF, for 
enforcement.  What India needs now is for the Court to maintain its activist 
approach to protection of the public interest.  At the same time, it must also 
reform its administrative agencies by encouraging greater accountability for 
agency inaction at both the agency and individual levels.  If the Court can 
continue its role as the good governance organ of the national government, 
and if administrative agency inaction decreases, the forests of India and those 
whose lives depend on them stand more than a fighting chance of seeing the 
end of this century in as good a shape as they saw the beginning. 
